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 ABSTRACT  
 
The paper suggests that there has been a shift in the allocation of bank credit from large firms to 
small firms before and after the economic crisis.  The paper also suggests that the improved lending 
practices of financial institutions, at least partially, contributed to this shift of corporate loans from 
large firms to small firms.  
Comparing the periods before and after the economic crisis also suggests that some important 
changes occurred to the corporate bond market.  The effect of firm size on the corporate bond 
market differs before and after the economic crisis.  Before the crisis, the larger the firms, the more 
they could borrow in the corporate bond market.  However, after the crisis, it is not the case.  The 
following interpretation could be put forward.  Before the crisis, investors in the corporate bond 
market expected that the government would rescue large firms if they face the risk of bankruptcies.  
However, the collapse of Daewoo Group in 1999 shattered the TBTF (Too Big To Fail) myth of the 
public.  The liquidity crisis of Hyundai Group in 2000-2001 reinforced the disintegration of the 
TBTF myth. 
 
 
 
 
경제위기 이후 은행 등 금융기관의 기업
규모별 대출분포를 살펴보면 대규모 기업
에서 중소규모 기업으로 그 비중이 이동하
였음을 알 수 있다. 이러한 현상의 원인 중
하나로 경제위기 이후 진행된 금융구조 개
혁으로 금융기관의 대출관행이 개선된 점
을 들 수 있다.  
경제위기 이후 회사채시장에서도 중요한
변화가 정착되고 있다. 경제위기 이전에는
기업 또는 그룹의 규모 자체가 회사채 조달
에 있어 중요한 결정요인 중 하나였는데, 
경제위기 이후 그러한 현상이 사라져가
고 있는 것이다. 이는 경제위기 이전에는 
소위 “대마불사”의 신화로 일반투자자들
이 대규모 재벌의 회사채를 수익성과 관
계없이 선호하였으나, 1999년 대우그룹 
붕괴 및 2000~2001년 현대그룹 유동성 
위기 등으로 그러한 불합리한 믿음이 깨
지게 된 것과 밀접한 관련이 있다. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Using the firm-level data set1, this paper attempts to examine the dynamic 
patterns in the allocation of credit across firms in Korea.  Supposedly, in Korea, the 
economic crisis in 1997 had a significant impact on the pattern in the allocation of 
credit across firms, in particular, across large and small firms. 
Corporate financing issues are intimately related to the cause of the Korean crisis.  
For instance, the chaebols’ indebtedness to banks is viewed as having contributed 
much to the crisis.2  Among others, Krueger and Yoo (2001) demonstrate that the 
chaebols’ indebtedness is indeed the chief culprit of the crisis.  In this regard, since 
the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997, the government has undertaken various 
reform measures to restructure the financial and corporate sectors3 .  The new 
regulatory system is now underway to induce the financial institutions to change 
their imprudent lending practices, and the capital market began to force the chaebols 
to correct their incentive structure.  Supposedly, these post-crisis developments in 
Korea have caused the chaebols and financial institutions to change their previously 
imprudent (borrowing and lending) practices. 
The paper suggests that large firms, to some extent, are leaving banks and going 
to the capital market for their financing after the crisis.4  The paper also suggests 
that small firms are gaining better access to credit by financial institutions after the 
crisis.  There has been a shift in the allocation of bank credit from large firms to 
small firms.  The paper suggests that the improved lending practices of financial 
institutions, at least partially, contributed to this shift of corporate loans from large 
firms to small firms.5   The paper also suggests the improved practices of the 
corporate bond market after the economic crisis.  For these purposes, the paper 
attempted to empirically investigate the determinants of corporate loans and bonds. 
The firms’ affiliation with chaebols was an important (positive) determinant of 
corporate loans before the crisis whereas it turned out to be the opposite after the 
crisis.  Furthermore, before the economic crisis, given the firms are affiliated with 
chaebols, the less profitable firms borrowed more from financial institutions.  But, 
after the economic crisis, given the firms are affiliated with chaebols, the more 
profitable firms borrowed more from financial institutions. 
Comparing the periods before and after the economic crisis also suggests that 
some important changes occurred to the corporate bond market.  The effect of firm 
size on the corporate bond market differs before and after the economic crisis.  
Before the crisis, the larger the firms, the more they could borrow in the corporate 
bond market.  However, after the crisis, it is not the case.  The following 
                                            
1 The data set covers most of the Korean firms except for extra-small ones. 
2 The failure of chaebols’ corporate governance exacerbated the situation. For the failure of chaebols’ 
corporate governance before the crisis, see Joh (2003). 
3 Bankruptcy policy reform was one of the essential elements in these structural reforms. Lim (2003a) 
studies empirically the post-crisis bankruptcy policy reform in Korea. 
4 Shortly after the crisis, the corporate bond market took off with the weak regulatory infrastructure. This 
immature expansion led to liquidity crises in 1999 and 2001. See Lim (2002) as well as Oh and Rhee (2002). 
5 Borensztein and Lee (2002) examine the micro data on Korean listed firms in 1996-1998. They suggest 
that chaebol-affiliated firms lost the preferential access to credit and that credit was reallocated in favor of 
more efficient firms. 
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interpretation could be put forward.  Before the crisis, investors in the corporate 
bond market expected that the government would rescue large firms if they face the 
risk of bankruptcies.  However, the collapse of Daewoo Group in 1999 shattered the 
TBTF (Too Big To Fail) myth of the public.  The liquidity crisis of Hyundai Group in 
2000-2001 reinforced the disintegration of the TBTF myth. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains the firm-level data.  In 
Section 3, we examine the dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit across firms by 
comparing empirical distributions before and after the economic crisis.  In Section 4, 
we look for the possible determinants of corporate loans and bonds before and after 
the economic crisis.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The Firm-level Data 
 
 
This study uses detailed financial information on the firms that have external 
audit reports.  According to the Act on External Audit of Joint-Stock Corporations, a 
firm with assets of 7 billion won or more must issue audited financial statements.  
The data thus include all the firms with assets of 7 billion won or more.  The total 
number of firms in the data is about 11,000. 
The Financial Supervisory Commission is responsible for establishing accounting 
and auditing standards and the Securities and Futures Commission is then 
responsible for the review of the audited financial statements issued by firms.  
Finally, the National Information and Credit Evaluation, Inc. (NICE) coded this 
public information into their database after checking the consistency of the reported 
financial statements.  The NICE data make us to construct the firms’ borrowings 
from all the financial institutions put together, but not the firms’ borrowings from 
each financial institution. 
<Table 1-1> presents summary statistics (mean, median, minimum, maximum, 
standard deviation) for the key variables in the empirical analysis.  It divides the 
sample period into the four sub-periods around the crisis: 1992-1996 (before the 
crisis), 1997-1998 (during the crisis), 1999-2001 (after the crisis I), and 2002-2005 (after 
the crisis II).  During the period of 1999-2001, liquidity crises continued to afflict the 
financial market as shown both in the collapse of Daewoo Group in 1999 and in the 
financial distress of Hyundai Group in 2000-2001.  Hence we divided the post-crisis 
period into the two sub-periods.  Profitability is measured by the EBIT (Earnings 
before Interest and Tax Payment) divided by total assets.  
The financing pattern varies according to the size of firms.  For example, the 
loans’ share in total asset varies according to the size of firms.  For this reason, we 
first divide all individual firms into ten groups based on the distribution of asset size, 
and then select three representative size cohorts for presenting the empirical results.  
We employ the following three size cohorts: (1) the largest firms (top 10% in asset 
size)6, (2) the medium-sized firms (middle 10% in asset size), and (3) the smallest  
<Table 1-1> Summary Statistics of Firm-level Data 
                                            
6 For the case of large firms, we present the results using this particular cohort, but defining the largest 
firms differently such as the top 1%, or the top 5%, does not change the qualitative results. 
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(million won) 
  1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
 N 28,189 15 ,069 32,349 52,159 
MEAN 61,832.3 98,940.1 88,817.9 100,983.8 
MEDIAN 8,474.3 11,460.4 11,573.9 17,586.2 
STD 473,180.1 866,687.8 882,797.3 976,202.6 
MIN 2.8360 2.6550 0.0840 0.0415 
ASSET MAX 32,026,789.1 49,083,094.2 64,529,738.4 68,898,808.3 
MEAN 35,257.7 60,041.5 57,829.7 62,547.2 
MEDIAN 3,937.9 5,144.9 4,844.8 7,208.5 
STD 359,035.2 669,577.0 742,819.1 769,501.2 
MIN 0.0000 0.0000 0.0149 -465.9013 
FIXED ASSET MAX 30,023,935.3 46,474,112.6 61,721,821.7 65,627,908.0 
MEAN 45,441.5 75,652.0 59,588.3 59,641.4 
MEDIAN 6,232.6 8,131.7 7,030.7 10,978.5 
STD 307,985.1 621,355.7 563,712.1 490,884.5 
MIN 0.0036 0.0000 -9.0810 -25.9839 
LIABILITIES MAX 16,935,173.4 31,223,840.0 33,582,612.1 24,591,864.2 
MEAN 23,451.4 39,033.8 23,766.1 22,164.3 
MEDIAN 3,216.2 4,588.9 3,338.8 5,794.9 
STD 135,646.2 266,406.6 196,967.6 172,837.2 
MIN 0.0000 -4,531.3135 -340.0000 -99.6915 
LOAN MAX 5,490,033.4 8,859,246.3 15,110,408.4 12,116,021.7 
MEAN 32,943.6 97,724.4 121,553.8 97,010.3 
MEDIAN 3,562.6 4,970.0 6,204.5 4,355.0 
STD 167,293.2 559,397.5 634,613.5 540,736.3 
MIN -93.0659 0.0000 0.0000 -7.3016 
BOND MAX 5,822,790.6 15,640,749.4 17,593,664.3 10,860,654.8 
MEAN 4,368.6 4,415.4 4,625.5 8,622.3 
MEDIAN 556.8 673.5 884.5 1,021.4 
STD 37,243.6 74,808.7 166,128.4 156,567.1 
MIN -247,334.6 -5,885,988.2 -17,239,034.1 -4,466,470.9 
EBIT MAX 2,882,958.7 2,400,227.7 8,443,815.7 18,657,308.0 
 
 
firms (bottom 10% in asset size). 
For the three size cohorts, <Table 1-2-1> to <Table 1-2-6> provides summary 
statistics (mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation) for the key 
variables in the empirical analysis. It also divides the sample period into the four 
sub-periods around the crisis.

 
<Table 1-2-1> Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data: Asset 
(million won) 
Large Firms 
(Top 10% in asset size) 
Medium-sized Firms 
(Middle 10% in asset size) 
Small Firms 
(Bottom 10% in asset size)   
  1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
N 2,817 1,506 3,234 5,214 2,820 1,507 3,234 5,216 2,823 1,507 3,237 5,218 
MEAN 506,549.0 839,832.6 742,003.8 798,033.1 10,058.6 13,338.7 13,379.5 20,175.9 1,139.0 1,244.6 1,538.0 4,847.3 
MEDIAN 154,008.3 216,359.5 189,134.4 213,897.2 10,159.7 13,242.1 13,340.9 19,953.5 1,117.8 1,219.6 1,490.0 5,042.5 
STD 1,421,158.3 2,628,164.0 2,705,726.7 2,998,483.6 2,062.4 1,275.0 1,499.5 3,189.7 618.4 758.8 924.8 2,479.5 
MIN 53,389.7 89,887.7 82,017.8 90,827.9 6,386.0 11,089.2 10,382.8 14,576.5 2.8360 2.6550 0.0840 0.0415 
MAX 32,026,789.1 49,083,094.2 64,529,738.4 68,898,808.3 14,312.4 16,164.5 16,759.1 27,425.5 2,582.3 2,657.0 3,652.6 8,823.1 
 
 
<Table 1-2-2> Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data: Fixed Asset 
(million won) 
Large Firms 
(Top 10% in asset size) 
Medium-sized Firms 
(Middle 10% in asset size) 
Small Firms 
(Bottom 10% in asset size)   
  1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
N 2,817 1,506 3,234 5,212 2,820 1,507 3,234 5,211 2,818 1,501 3,229 5,189 
MEAN 297,092.8 524,583.7 507,872.7 528,619.1 5,012.7 6,443.1 6,242.1 8,853.8 472.0 486.4 588.1 2,061.6 
MEDIAN 78,565.2 114,766.7 104,039.8 117,635.7 4,750.1 6,300.9 6,110.8 8,517.2 350.3 310.0 397.5 1,517.2 
STD 1,101,505.3 2,060,534.0 2,300,441.7 2,382,458.3 2,568.3 3,310.0 3,575.1 5,806.5 416.0 469.6 570.0 1,914.6 
MIN 937.2 1,345.0 15.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4130 0.0000 0.0149 0.0124 
MAX 30,023,935.3 46,474,112.6 61,721,821.7 65,627,908.0 13,882.9 15,512.7 16,392.9 27,398.2 4,804.6 2,556.6 3,384.5 8,789.4 
 
<Table 1-2-3> Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data: Liabilities  
(million won) 
Large Firms 
(Top 10% in asset size) 
Medium-sized Firms 
(Middle 10% in asset size) 
Small Firms 
(Bottom 10% in asset size)  
 
1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
N 2,817 1,506 3,234 5,214 2,820 1,507 3,234 5,216 2,808 1,486 3,185 5,192 
MEAN 369,153.2 642,315.8 498,828.7 447,958.4 7,572.2 9,845.0 8,784.2 13,178.0 831.1 911.2 915.9 3,852.8 
MEDIAN 118,273.7 165,475.3 118,619.5 123,829.7 7,263.1 9,757.0 8,589.6 12,846.8 756.1 825.8 783.1 2,981.6 
STD 911,710.4 1,870,792.5 1,719,506.1 1,448,569.0 2,833.9 4,431.7 4,863.1 7,242.4 581.8 694.6 776.3 7,989.1 
MIN 191.2 1,024.1 122.1 13.3 21.5 0.8 0.5 2.4 0.0036 0.0000 -9.0810 -25.9839 
MAX 16,935,173.4 31,223,840.0 33,582,612.1 24,591,864.2 33,705.5 81,445.4 109,964.8 129,198.9 6,274.4 10,135.4 7,469.7 512,622.0 
 
 
<Table 1-2-4> Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data: Loan  
(million won) 
Large Firms 
(Top 10% in asset size) 
Medium-sized Firms 
(Middle 10% in asset size) 
Small Firms 
(Bottom 10% in asset size)  
1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
N 2,745 1,463 2,955 4,346 2,497 1,328 2,815 4,393 1,181 615 1,819 3,791 
MEAN 152,616.4 254,940.9 165,858.1 136,596.6 3,200.4 4,425.7 4,213.2 7,228.5 403.6 484.4 533.8 2,348.2 
MEDIAN 49,326.3 69,601.7 43,530.0 47,682.2 2,932.2 4,042.1 3,728.2 6,396.0 286.0 349.3 393.3 1,535.2 
STD 354,273.1 702,208.2 561,235.3 479,591.8 2,125.0 3,801.0 3,874.1 5,937.0 402.0 538.0 508.8 2,750.0 
MIN 7.4 114.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0043 0.1446 -340.0000 0.0470 
MAX 5,490,033.4 8,859,246.3 15,110,408.4 12,116,021.7 24,135.6 74,452.9 106,349.4 126,063.5 5,501.6 8,560.9 5,495.4 35,294.6 
<Table 1-2-5> Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data: Bond 
(million won) 
Large Firms 
(Top 10% in asset size) 
Medium-sized Firms 
(Middle 10% in asset size) 
Small Firms 
(Bottom 10% in asset size)  
 
1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
N 2,028 1,070 1,573 1,856 476 205 153 403 22 10 75 339 
MEAN 91,669.7 245,841.3 264,694.0 278,372.1 981.0 1,545.2 1,853.7 3,114.8 253.5 293.3 563.1 1,586.5 
MEDIAN 23,697.9 39,311.0 38,589.9 39,242.5 782.5 939.0 990.7 2,285.7 82.5 154.1 512.3 1,114.5 
STD 278,681.0 879,497.2 925,603.4 882,445.0 775.7 1,652.8 2,029.8 2,758.5 411.1 369.6 417.3 2,923.3 
MIN 42.7 73.7 0.0 -7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 18.2850 0.8376 0.0000 7.0524 
MAX 5,822,790.6 15,640,749.4 17,593,664.3 10,860,654.8 4,397.5 9,141.5 10,544.7 24,144.5 1,708.0 1,192.8 1,966.5 49,071.9 
 
 
<Table 1-2-6> Summary Statistics for the Three size Cohorts in Firm-level Data: EBIT 
(million won) 
Large Firms 
(Top 10% in asset size) 
Medium-sized Firms 
(Middle 10% in asset size) 
Small Firms 
(Bottom 10% in asset size)  
 
1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
N 2,817 1,505 3,193 5,209 2,819 1,504 3,112 5,203 2,601 1,270 2,287 4,828 
MEAN 34,395.4 33,960.8 29,822.7 71,755.7 772.1 961.8 1,046.9 1,243.0 80.5 71.5 8.2 -207.3 
MEDIAN 10,931.0 11,091.4 11,725.2 15,048.3 710.6 926.8 940.8 1,164.1 66.0 58.7 30.9 125.7 
STD 111,413.2 228,388.7 488,327.8 485,980.2 913.2 1,502.1 1,726.8 3,229.6 148.9 283.3 413.8 3,148.0 
MIN -247,334.6 -5,885,988.2 -17,239,034.1 -4,466,470.9 -9,209.1 -11,066.6 -20,796.2 -43,435.9 -1,519.0 -5,473.8 -6,244.9 -61,929.9 
MAX 2,882,958.7 2,400,227.7 8,443,815.7 18,657,308.0 12,149.4 14,766.3 21,296.8 71,472.5 1,587.3 1,779.4 3,152.9 122,033.7 
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<Table 1-2-1> 
<Table 1-2-2> 
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<Table 1-2-3> 
<Table 1-2-4> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246    韓國開發硏究 / 2006. Ⅱ  
 
 
<Table 1-2-5> 
<Table 1-2-6> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of Corporate Loans and Bonds before and after Economic Crisis in Korea       247 
 
 
The statistics in <Table 1-2>’s present a different picture compared to the one in 
<Table 1-1>.  The aggregate numbers in <Table 1-1> do not fully capture the 
changes in the financing pattern experienced by heterogeneous firms during the 
sample period.  For instance, profitability evolves differently according to size 
groups.  During the period of 1992-2001, profitability worsens for large and small 
firms whereas it rebounds for medium-sized firms.  On the other hand, during the 
period of 2002-2005, profitability worsens only for small firms whereas it rebounds 
for large firms.  While the share of loans in asset decreases for large firms, the 
opposite is the case for the other groups. 
 
 
3. Dynamic Patterns in the Allocation of Credit across Large 
and Small Firms: Loans and Bonds 
 
 
In Section 2, the summary statistics of key variables hint that the heterogeneity of 
firms is important in understanding the evolution of corporate borrowing patterns 
after the crisis.  The sample means of key variables hint the following pattern 
around the crisis: the largest firms are leaving financial institutions and switching 
directly to the financial markets for their financing, whereas the small- and 
medium-sized firms are increasing their dependency on financial institutions for 
financing.  The empirical distributions of key variables show this point more clearly.  
The empirical distributions have different shapes according to the size of firms and 
evolve differently after the crisis.  In this section, we present the result from 
comparing the empirical distributions of key variables before and after the crisis. 
 
 
3.1 Empirical Distribution of Corporate Loans for Different Cohorts 
 
[Figure 1-1-1] and [Figure 1-1-2] show the distribution of the loan-borrowing ratio 
for the largest cohort (top 1% firms in asset size) before and after the crisis.  After the 
crisis, the loan-borrowing ratio distribution for the largest firms shifts leftwards clearly, 
as seen in [Figure 1-1-2].  This leftward shift starts partly in 1997 during the crisis. 
For the small-sized firms (bottom 10% firms in asset size) the distribution of the 
loan-borrowing ratio shifts to the right markedly in 1996 (actually in 1995, although 
not shown in the paper) and maintains more or less this pattern even after the crisis 
([Figure 1-2-1] and [Figure 1-2-2]). 
In [Figure 1-2-1], we note that, until 1994, a certain portion of the firms in our 
database does not have any access to financial institutions for their corporate 
financing.  One could see a certain dense around zero.  However, after 1994, this 
pattern changes: the dense around zero continue to disappear until 1997, and, after 
the crisis, a dense around zero appears again, but to a much smaller scale than before 
1995.  [Figure 1-2-1] and [Figure 1-2-2] make another interesting point.  After 1994, 
we continue to see a peak at one and a certain mass around one, which indicates that 
these firms depend completely on the loans from financial institutions for their 
borrowing. 
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[Figure 1-1-1] Largest Firms - Top 1 %; Before the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1-1-2] Largest Firms - Top 1 %; After the Crisis 
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[Figure 1-2-1] Small-sized Firms - Bottom 10%; Before the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1-2-2] Small-sized Firms - Bottom 10%; After the Crisis 
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[Figure 1-3-1] Medium-sized Firms - Middle 10%; Before the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1-3-2] Medium-sized Firms - Middle 10%; After the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the medium-sized firms, the share of loans in total borrowing does not show 
any marked changes before and after the crisis, except that, after the crisis, we could 
see a more cluster around one ([Figure 1-3-1] and [Figure 1-3-2]). 
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3.2 Empirical Distribution of Corporate Bonds for Different Cohorts 
 
The result in the above implies that the large firms move to some other sources of 
financing after the crisis.  This section will show that the large firms go to the bond 
market to compensate the decrease in loans by financial institutions.  This was 
hinted in Section 2. 
[Figure 2-1-1] and [Figure 2-1-2] show the bond-borrowing ratio distributions 
before and after the crisis for the largest cohort.  After the crisis, the 
bond-borrowing ratio distribution for the largest firms shifts clearly to the right 
([Figure 2-1-2]). 
In [Figure 2-2-1] and [Figure 2-2-2], we show the similar figures for another size 
cohort (top 11% - top 20% firms in asset size).  This cohort is, in fact, the smallest 
firms to have any access to the bond market at all in the sample period.  For this 
cohort, the bond-borrowing ratio distribution shifts to the right marginally before the 
crisis.  After the crisis, however, the distribution shifts back to the left.  There is a 
large peak around zero in 1999 and the distribution becomes degenerate in 2000 (i.e., 
this cohort does not have any access to the bond market).  A large proportion of the 
bonds that has been issued during the crisis, was under the risk of default, especially 
after the demise of the Daewoo group in 1999 (the second largest business group at 
that time in Korea).  The demise of the Daewoo group put the whole market for 
corporate bonds into a state of malfunction in 1999 and in 2000. 
 
 
[Figure 2-1-1] Large-sized Firms - Top 1 %; Before the Crisis 
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[Figure 2-1-2] Large-sized Firms - Top 1 %; After the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 2-2-1] Top 11% - Top 20% in Asset Size; Before the Crisis 
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[Figure 2-2-2] Top 11% - Top 20% in Asset Size; After the Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Determinants of Corporate Loans and Bonds 
 
 
In this section, we look for the possible determinants of corporate loans and 
bonds before and after the economic crisis.   
Both theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that firm size, profitability, and 
collateral ability, among others, could be important determinants of corporate 
borrowing.  The log of total asset is used to measure firm size, whereas we use the 
ratio of fixed asset to total asset as a proxy variable for collateral ability.  As 
mentioned in Section 2, profitability is measured by the ratio of EBIT (Earnings 
before Interest and Tax Payment) to total assets. 
Next, we include several dummy variables to control for the effect of going public, 
chaebol effect, economic crisis effect, business cycle effect, and industry effect. List 
dummy variable measures the effect of public companies as compared to private 
companies.  Chaebol dummy variable identifies the sample firm’s belonging to 
chaebols.  The Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) identifies the large business 
groups and announces them every year.  We use the definition of chaebols by the 
KFTC.  The dummy variable for economic crisis assigns 1 to the period of 1997-98, 0 
otherwise.  Year dummy variable is introduced to control for the effect of business 
cycle whereas industry dummy is included to control for the effect of industry.  
Lastly, we include an interaction dummy variable, chaebol dummy multiplied by 
profitability. 
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4.1 Determinants of Loans 
 
In the regression, the dependent variable is the loan-asset ratio (defined as the 
borrowing from financial institutions divided by total asset).  <Table 2-1>, <Table 
2-2>, and <Table 2-3> summarize the regression results.  The estimation method of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) was used.  We also tried the (within unit) fixed effects 
estimation, but it produced similar results. 
First, we divided the whole sample into the two groups, listed companies and 
unlisted companies, and ran the same regression separately to the two groups.  
<Table 2-1> reports the regression results for all samples, listed companies, and 
unlisted companies.  The hypothesis here is that public companies might behave 
differently as compared to private companies since they have other sources of 
corporate financing.  <Table 2-1> shows that the coefficient on list dummy variable 
is negative and significant: listed companies depend less on loans.  Regarding firm 
size, profitability, collateral ability, and the effect of crisis period, the listed and 
unlisted companies do behave similarly.   
However, regarding chabol effect, the listed and unlisted companies do behave 
differently.  First, the chaebol-affiliated listed companies depend less on loans 
compared to independent listed companies, whereas the chaebol-affiliated unlisted 
companies depend more on loans compared to independent unlisted companies.  
Second, given they are affiliated with chaebols, the less profitable listed companies 
borrowed more from financial institutions, whereas the more profitable unlisted 
companies borrowed more from financial institutions. 
Next, we divided the whole sample into the four sub-periods and ran the same 
regression separately to the sub-periods.  The regression result is shown in <Table 
2-2>.  Regarding firm size, profitability, collateral ability, and the effect of going 
public, all the sub-periods produced similar results to the one from the whole sample 
period.   
However, when it comes to the effect of affiliating with chaebols, <Table 2-2> 
shows different results. First, before the crisis, chaebol-affiliated companies 
borrowed more from financial institutions compared to independent companies, 
whereas, after the crisis, chaebol-affiliated companies borrowed less from financial 
institutions compared to independent companies.  Second, before the crisis, given 
they are affiliated with chaebols, the more profitable listed companies borrowed 
more from financial institutions, whereas the pre-crisis period does not produce any 
significant result.  These two results point to the fact that the market for corporate 
loans enhanced the efficiency in resource allocation after the financial crisis of 1997.  
In other words, financial institutions improved their lending practices towards big 
business groups after the economic crisis. 
Next, we divided the whole sample into both the four sub-periods and the ten 
size groups.  We ran the same regression separately to the size groups in each 
sub-period.  For the large and small groups before and after the crisis, the 
regression results are shown in <Table 2-3>.  Except for the effect of collateral, the 
size groups behave similarly to each other in each sub-period.  For large companies, 
the collateral ability was an important determinant of corporate loans before the 
crisis, whereas it is not after the crisis.  This result is consistent with the previous 
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<Table 2-1> Determinants of Corporate Loans 
 
Dependent variable 
Borrowing from Financial Institutions / Total Asset Independent 
Variables : 
All Listed Firm Unlisted Firm 
Firm Size -0.029227** (-31.59) 
-0.036987** 
(-25.50) 
-0.028257** 
(-23.27) 
EBIT/Asset -0.290248** (-63.17) 
-0.267790** 
(-40.36) 
-0.308511** 
(-50.64) 
Borrowing(t-1) 0.065079** (21.10) 
0.023758** 
(6.62) 
0.158999** 
(29.00) 
Fixed Asset/ Total 
Asset 
0.131092** 
(27.32) 
0.200425** 
(18.44) 
0.120516** 
(22.44) 
List Dummy -0.046471** (-18.10)   
Chaebol -0.043225** (-7.92) 
0.021503** 
(2.80) 
-0.066738** 
(-8.44) 
Chaebol* 
(EBIT/Asset) 
0.447972** 
(15.35) 
-0.112649** 
(-2.03) 
0.531704** 
(15.46) 
Dummy for Crisis 
Period (97~98) 
0.050290** 
(8.15) 
0.053337** 
(5.15) 
0.054114** 
(7.23) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Number of 
Observations 80,882 20,514 60,368 
Note:  1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2. * significant at the 10% significance level. 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3. Firm size is measured by the log of total asset. 
      4. The independent variable “Chaebol” denotes for the dummy for the big business groups legally 
defined by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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<Table 2-2> Determinants of Corporate Loans for Sub-period (I) 
 
Dependent variable 
Borrowing from Financial Institutions / Total Asset Independent 
Variables : 
1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
Firm Size -0.014277** (-9.11) 
-0.013198** 
(-6.30) 
-0.024973** 
(-13.62) 
-0.047138** 
(-28.84) 
EBIT/Asset -0.554560** (-31.39) 
-0.392148** 
(-29.31) 
-0.349424** 
(-29.13) 
-0.252323** 
(-41.85) 
Borrowing(t-1) 0.074994** (5.97) 
0.016191** 
(2.43) 
0.075039** 
(16.82) 
0.072996** 
(11.34) 
Fixed Asset/ 
Total Asset 
0.171695** 
(17.97) 
0.236490** 
(18.71) 
0.170876** 
(16.29) 
0.102402** 
(14.11) 
List Dummy -0.020267** (-4.96) 
-0.029564** 
(-5.07) 
-0.045274** 
(-8.90) 
-0.068163** 
(-15.10) 
Chaebol 0.020830** (2.13) 
0.002455 
(0.23) 
-0.096787** 
(-8.71) 
-0.084582** 
(-8.00) 
Chaebol* 
(EBIT/Asset) 
0.142019 
(1.50) 
-0.095785 
(-1.49) 
0.733454** 
(15.75) 
0.499114** 
(9.49) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Number of 
Observations 15,765 9,930 19,019 36,168 
Note:  1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2. * significant at the 10% significance level. 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
3. Firm size is measured by the log of total asset. 
      4. The independent variable “Chaebol” denotes for the dummy for the big business groups legally 
defined by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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<Table 2-3> Determinants of Corporate Loans for Sub-period (II) 
 
Dependent variable 
Borrowing from Financial Institutions / Total Asset 
1992~1996 2002~2005 
Independent 
Variables : 
Large Firm Small Firm Large Firm Small Firm 
Firm Size -0.029247** (-5.02) 
-0.200298** 
(-9.22) 
-0.038007** 
(-6.75) 
-0.241116** 
(-16.91) 
EBIT/Asset -0.499235** (-6.59) 
-0.734748** 
(-6.74) 
-0.586840** 
(-17.29) 
-0.203096** 
(-16.75) 
Borrowing(t-1) 0.073540** (5.12) 
0.468002** 
(12.33) 
0.045995** 
(7.25) 
0.081134** 
(30.44) 
Fixed Asset/ 
Total Asset 
0.057653** 
(2.20) 
0.087035 
(1.61) 
0.000148 
(0.01) 
0.080849** 
(2.31) 
List Dummy -0.046521** (-5.37) 
0.030033 
(0.89) 
-0.082421** 
(-8.83) 
-0.052044** 
(-2.28) 
Chaebol 0.084589** (6.28) - 
-0.070500** 
(-5.17) 
0.069151 
(0.49) 
Chaebol* 
(EBIT/Asset) 
-0.545554** 
(-3.68) - 
0.249724** 
(2.37) 
0.382456** 
(3.52) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Number of 
Observations 2,272 522 4,110 2,763 
Note:  1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2. * significant at the 10% significance level. 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
3. Firm size is measured by the log of total asset. 
      4. The independent variable “Chaebol” denotes for the dummy for the big business groups legally 
defined by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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implication that financial institutions improved their lending practices towards big 
business groups after the economic crisis.  Note that, for small companies, the 
collateral ability was not an important determinant of corporate loans before the 
crisis, whereas it becomes an important factor after the crisis. 
 
 
4.2 Determinants of Corporate Bonds 
 
In the regression, the dependent variable is the bond-asset ratio (defined as the 
bond holdings divided by total asset).  The regression results are shown in <Table 
3-1> and <Table 3-2>.  As in the case of corporate loans, the OLS estimation method 
was used.  The (within unit) fixed effects estimation was also tried for robustness 
check, but it does not change the main results. 
In the first set of regressions, we divided the whole sample into the listed and 
unlisted companies.  <Table 3-1> reports the regression results for all samples, 
listed companies, and unlisted companies.  <Table 3-1> shows that the coefficient 
on list dummy variable is positive and significant: listed companies borrowed more 
in the corporate bond market than unlisted companies.  Unlike corporate loans 
from financial institutions, borrowing in the corporate bond market usually requires 
the reputation from the public. 
 The patterns in the corporate bond market are similar to the ones in the 
corporate loan market. With respect to firm size, profitability, and collateral ability, 
the listed and unlisted companies do behave similarly.  For unlisted companies, the 
effect of crisis period is not significant. 
As in the case of corporate loans, the affiliation with chaebols has different effects 
on listed and unlisted companies.  First, the chaebol-affiliated listed companies 
borrowed more in the corporate bond market relative to independent listed 
companies, whereas the chaebol-affiliated unlisted companies borrowed less in the 
corporate bond market compared to independent unlisted companies.  Second, 
given the affiliation with chaebols, the less profitable listed companies borrowed 
more in the corporate bond market, whereas the opposite is the case in the group of 
unlisted companies. 
In the second set of regressions, we divided the whole sample into the four 
sub-periods.  <Table 3-2> shows the regression result.  We note the following two 
things. 
First, the effect of firm size differs before and after the economic crisis.  Before 
the crisis, the larger the firms, the more they could borrow in the corporate bond 
market.  However, after the crisis, it is not the case.  One possible interpretation is 
as follows.  Before the crisis, the TBTF myth had an effect on the perception of the 
public.  That is, investors in the corporate bond market expected that the 
government would rescue large firms if they face the risk of bankruptcies.  This 
kind of expectation by  the public was often fulfilled by the government’s rescuing 
big business groups in case of near bankruptcies.  However, the collapse of Daewoo 
Group in 1999 shattered the TBTF myth.  The Daewoo Group was the second 
largest business group at the time.  The liquidity crisis of Hyundai Group in  
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<Table 3-1> Determinants of Corporate Bonds 
 
Dependent variable 
Bond / Total Asset Independent 
Variables : 
All Listed Firm Unlisted Firm 
Firm Size -0.006432** (-5.10) 
-0.003314** 
(-2.06) 
-0.014005** 
(-6.93) 
EBIT/Asset -0.243308** (-43.66) 
-0.169265** 
(-23.35) 
-0.318397** 
(-38.72) 
Borrowing(t-1) 0.045706** (21.27) 
0.014400** 
(5.85) 
0.114846** 
(28.12) 
Fixed Asset/ 
Total Asset 
0.030238** 
(3.59) 
0.028039** 
(2.33) 
0.036964** 
(3.18) 
List Dummy 0.010282** (3.25)   
Chaebol -0.003801 (-0.77) 
0.038878** 
(6.40) 
-0.021412** 
(-2.47) 
Chaebol* 
(EBIT/Asset) 
0.508267** 
(20.31) 
-0.052508 
(-1.28) 
0.659630** 
(20.56) 
Dummy for Crisis 
Period (97~98) 
0.012609* 
(1.85) 
0.019409** 
(2.16) 
0.006616 
(0.68) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Number of 
Observations 15,918 8,961 6,957 
Note:  1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2. * significant at the 10% significance level. 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3. Firm size is measured by the log of total asset. 
      4. The independent variable “Chaebol” denotes for the dummy for the big business groups legally 
defined by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
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<Table 3-2> Determinants of Corporate Bonds for Sub-period 
 
Dependent variable 
Bond / Total Asset Independent 
Variables : 
1992~1996 1997~1998 1999~2001 2002~2005 
Firm Size 0.008469** (6.36) 
0.008652** 
(3.81) 
-0.007937* 
(-1.83) 
-0.013345** 
(-6.15) 
EBIT/Asset -0.134844** (-7.21) 
-0.130830** 
(-12.28) 
-0.355732** 
(-17.48) 
-0.226826** 
(-32.89) 
Borrowing(t-1) 0.017874** (2.89) 
0.015594** 
(3.74) 
0.064532** 
(12.74) 
0.023824** 
(6.02) 
Fixed Asset/ 
Total Asset 
-0.007224 
(-0.83) 
-0.027522* 
(-1.85) 
0.036364 
(1.18) 
0.088361** 
(6.56) 
List Dummy 0.013400** (4.60) 
0.009459* 
(1.75) 
0.025480** 
(2.22) 
-0.006980 
(-1.30) 
Chaebol -0.000678 (-0.10) 
0.055053** 
(7.10) 
-0.023961 
(-1.46) 
0.025705** 
(2.60) 
Chaebol* 
(EBIT/Asset) 
0.048551 
(0.69) 
-0.058131 
(-1.33) 
0.818367** 
(15.47) 
0.072016 
(1.11) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Number of 
Observations 4,836 2,694 3,176 5,212 
Note:  1. Number in the parenthesis are t-values. 
      2. * significant at the 10% significance level. 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
      3. Firm size is measured by the log of total asset. 
      4. The independent variable “Chaebol” denotes for the dummy for the big business groups legally 
defined by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
 
 
2000-2001 reinforced the disintegration of the TBTF myth.7
Second, the collateral ability was not an important factor in the corporate bonds 
                                            
7 For the detailed account of the disintegration of the TBTF myth after the economic crisis, see Lim (2002). 
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market before the crisis.  Given the asset size itself was an important factor in the 
corporate bond market before the economic crisis, the collateral ability might have 
not had an additional information content. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The paper documents that large firms, to some extent, are leaving financial 
institutions and going to the capital market for their financing after the crisis.8  It 
also shows that small firms have better access to credit by financial institutions after 
the crisis.  Financial institutions are reallocating their credit from large firms to 
small firms after the crisis. 
We then attempted to empirically investigate the determinants of corporate 
borrowing before and after the economic crisis.  The firms’ affiliation with chaebols 
was an important (positive) determinant of corporate loans before the crisis whereas 
it turned out to be the opposite after the crisis.  Furthermore, before the economic 
crisis, given the firms are affiliated with chaebols, the less profitable firms borrowed 
more from financial institutions.  But, after the economic crisis, given the firms are 
affiliated with chaebols, the more profitable firms borrowed more from financial 
institutions.  These results could be partially contributed to the improved lending 
practices of financial institutions towards large firms (in particular, big business 
groups) after the economic crisis. 
We also investigated the determinants of corporate borrowing from the bond 
market.  Comparing the periods before and after the economic crisis suggests that 
some important changes occurred to the corporate bond market.  First, the effect of 
firm size on the corporate bond market differs before and after the economic crisis.  
Before the crisis, the larger the firms, the more they could borrow in the corporate 
bond market.  However, after the crisis, it is not the case.  The following 
interpretation could be put forward.  Before the crisis, investors in the corporate bond 
market expected that the government would rescue large firms if they face the risk of 
bankruptcies.  However, the collapse of Daewoo Group in 1999 shattered the TBTF 
myth of the public.  The liquidity crisis of Hyundai Group in 2000-2001 reinforced the 
disintegration of the TBTF myth.  Second, the collateral ability was not an important 
factor in the corporate bond market before the crisis.  Given the asset size itself was an 
important factor in the corporate bond market before the economic crisis, the collateral 
ability might have not had an additional information content. 
                                            
8 Clearly, the liberalization of financial markets, which happened at an accelerating rate after the crisis, 
contributed to broaden the supply base of various corporate financing sources.  But, for further deepening 
of the supply base of various corporate financing sources, Korea needs better protection of investors’ 
rights. 
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